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THE MONTREAL CONVENTION'S STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS-A FAILED ATTEMPT AT CONSISTENCY
ALLISON STEWART*
I. INTRODUCTION
N NARAYANANV. BRITISHAIRWAYS, the Ninth Circuit inter-
preted, as a matter of first impression, Article 35 or the "Limi-
tations Clause" of the Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules for International Carriage by Air (Montreal Convention)
as it applies to injuries or deaths occurring after a flight's arrival
at its destination and as a result of an accident committed by the
airline.' The court found that Article 35 and Article 29 (Basis of
Claims Article) together unmistakably confirm that the Mon-
treal Convention's two-year statute of limitations is strict and
that there is no room for triggering events not listed in the Con-
vention.2 The court's decision in this case will undoubtedly serve
as an influence to other courts applying the Montreal Conven-
tion's statute of limitations to cases involving victims of airline or
aircraft accidents, and it will ultimately limit the remedies availa-
ble to those victims subject to circumstances not considered by
the Convention. In other words, the Montreal Convention does
not account for injuries suffered by airline passengers that are
treated and minimized due to modern medicine. The appropri-
ate action in this case would have been to deny the airline's mo-
tion to dismiss and allow the two-year limitation to be used as an
affirmative defense by British Airways instead of a condition pre-
cedent that had to be met by the plaintiffs before the case was
truly heard by the court. Had the court taken this approach, the
* Allison Stewart, J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2016; B.A.
Sociology, Texas Tech University. The author would like to thank her husband
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Narayanan v. British Airways, 747 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2014); Convention for
the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air art. 35, May 28,
1999, T.I.A.S. 13038, 2242 U.N.T.S. 350 [hereinafter Montreal Convention].
2 Narayanan, 747 F.3d at 1132.
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claim would have survived and the true merits of the case could
have been considered.
The plaintiffs, survivors of Panpansam Narayanan, filed a
complaint against British Airways under the Montreal Conven-
tion, alleging that the airline's refusal to supply Narayanan with
necessary oxygen aboard an international flight hastened his
death.' Narayanan suffered from a severe lung disease and re-
quired supplemental oxygen while on board a flight from Los
Angeles to India on December 26, 2008.' British Airways denied
Narayanan access to his supplemental oxygen while onboard the
flight, and he required medical attention upon arriving at the
stopover destination in London.5 After returning to the United
States on January 16, 2009, and receiving further medical treat-
ment, his health "continued to deteriorate and, on June 11,
2009, Narayanan died."6
The plaintiffs filed their suit on March 7, 2011, less than two
years after the death of Narayanan but roughly two years and
three months after his international flight arrived at its destina-
tion.7 British Airways moved to dismiss the suit under Rule
12 (b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, stating that the
claim was "time-barred under the two-year limitation period es-
tablished by Article 35(1) of the Convention ...."8 The lower
court granted the motion to dismiss, and the plaintiffs appealed
to the Ninth Circuit.9
II. THE MONTREAL CONVENTION EXAMINED
The Montreal Convention was adopted in 1999 and serves as
the successor to the Warsaw Convention, a very similar treaty
introduced in 1934.0 The Montreal Convention "governs inter-
national carrier liability for flights between the United States
and foreign states that are parties to the Convention, and for
international flights having both their origin and destination in






9 Id. at 1127.
10 Beverly L. Jacklin, Construction and Application of Warsaw Convention Provision
(U.S. C.A. Conventions, Warsaw Convention Art 29(1) Establishing a 2-year Limitation
Period for Damage Action, 103 A.L.R. FED. 286, § 2[a] (1991).
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the United States."'" The purpose of the Montreal Convention
was and continues to be (1) "to establish some degree of uni-
formity in the manner in which claims arising in the course of
international travel are handled"; and (2) "to limit the potential
liability of the air carrier so as to aid in the development of in-
ternational air transportation, to provide a definite basis for in-
surance rates for airlines, and, thereby, to reduce operating
expenses, with subsequent savings to the airline industry and its
passengers.' ' 2
Article 29 of the Montreal Convention states that "any action
for damages, however founded, whether under this Convention
or in contract or in tort or otherwise, can only be brought sub-
ject to the conditions and such limits of liability as are set out in
this Convention .... ." One such limitation is Article 35, which
states that "[t]he right to damages shall be extinguished if an
action is not brought within a period of two years, reckoned from
the date of arrival at the destination, or from the date on which
the aircraft ought to have arrived, or from the date on which the
aircraft on which the carriage stopped.' 14
III. PLAINTIFFS' ARGUMENTS AND THE NINTH
CIRCUIT'S RESPONSE
The statute of limitations section, Article 35, was the central
issue in Narayanan, particularly "whether Article 35(1) applies
irrespective of when a claim actually accrues, or whether local
law governs the timeliness of any claims which were not in exis-
tence when the aircraft arrived at its destination."'' The court
began by looking at the plain text of Article 35(1), concluding
that it "leaves no room for flexibility as to the commencement of
the limitations period."'6 The court viewed the plaintiffs' re-
quest to construe the timeliness of their claim under California
law as a request "to write an implied fourth trigger into the Con-
vention's terms," and ultimately refused to do so. 7 The court
relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in El Al Israel Air-
lines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng to emphasize that the terms in the
Montreal Convention are those terms that the "drafters settled
11 DeJoseph v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 595, 600 (D.NJ. 2014).
12 Jacklin, supra note 10, § 2[a].
13 Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. 29.
14 Id. art. 35(1) (emphasis added).
15 Narayanan v. British Airways, 747 F.3d 1125, 1128 (9th Cir. 2014).
16 Id.
17 Id. at 1129.
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on-and that 103 separate signatory nations agreed to-in their
efforts 'to accommodate or balance the interests of passengers
seeking recovery for personal injuries, and the interests of air
carriers seeking to limit potential liability."" 8
The court next evaluated, then rejected, the plaintiffs' argu-
ment that use of the words "the" and "an" in Article 35 only
refers to a cause of action that exists at the time the aircraft ar-
rived at its destination or else the drafters of the Montreal Con-
vention would have used "any" when referring to a claim for
damages.'9 The court dismissed this "faulty logic" by citing to
Article 29 of the Convention, which does use the term "any" and
thereby requires that all causes of action be subject to the limita-
tions period.2 °
The plaintiffs later asserted that under Zicherman v. Korean Air
Lines Co., "where the Convention is silent or ambiguous on a key
point . . . a 'pass through' to local law is permissible, if not
mandatory. "21 The plaintiffs argued that this kind of pass-
through is appropriate in their case because the Montreal Con-
vention is silent on claims that accrue after the aircraft has ar-
rived at its destination.22 Again the court rejected the argument
by explaining "[t] he more natural interpretation of Article 35 is
that it was intended to operate without reference to when a par-
ticular claim actually accrued. '23 The court clarified that the
"pass-through" position pronounced in Zicherman is not applica-
ble to the instant case because it was meant only to apply to
issues of compensatory damages.24
Finally, the plaintiffs argued that Article 35(2) of the Mon-
treal Convention is actually consistent with California law. 25 Arti-
cle 35(2) states "[t]he method of calculating [the two-year]
period shall be determined by the law of the court seized of the
case. '"26 The court offered precedent to support its position that
this part of the treaty has never been construed to mean any-
thing beyond the invocation of "the power of the forum court to
determine whether the plaintiff accomplished the filing within




21 Id. (quoting Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217 (1996)).
22 Id. at 1129.
23 Id. at 1130.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. 35(2).
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the limitation period.. . -in other words, matters bearing on
when an action has been 'brought.'
2 7
The court finalized its opinion by emphasizing that the draft-
ers of the Montreal Convention rejected "a proposal that would
have allowed the limitations period to be tolled in accordance
with the law of the forum court."28 The dissent countered the
majority's opinion by stressing the outdated tendencies of the
29Convention, particularly the fact that the Warsaw Convention
was adopted at a time when the airline industry was new and
needed protection from litigation . 0 The dissent determined
that the retention of the Warsaw Convention's "rigid statute of
limitations.., continues to protect international airline carriers
at the expense of its passengers, and bars Mr. Narayanan's fam-
ily from holding British Airways accountable for its
misconduct.""
IV. ANALYSIS
A. NINTH CIRCUIT'S FAULTY INTERPRETATION OF THE
LIMITATIONS RULE
The Ninth Circuit applied the limitations rule of the Montreal
Convention as a condition precedent that the plaintiffs had to
meet before they were able to properly bring a claim instead of
viewing the rule as an affirmative defense or an ordinary statute
of limitations defense to be asserted by the airline. This type of
interpretation places the burden on plaintiffs from the begin-
ning, and its long-term effect is a prevention that would keep
plaintiffs from filing suit if they did not meet the narrow criteria
laid out in the Montreal Convention. Many courts have taken
the latter approach of viewing the statute of limitations as a de-
fense to protect plaintiffs (usually individuals) instead of grant-
ing further protection to major airlines. 2
27 Narayanan, 747 F.3d at 1130 (quoting Fishman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 132
F.3d 138, 144 (2d Cir. 1998)).
28 Id. at 1131.
29 Id. at 1132-33.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 1133.
32 See Wolgel v. Mexicana Airlines, 821 F.2d 442, 443-44 (7th Cir. 1987) (inter-
preting the statute of limitations in the Warsaw Convention to be just a statute of
limitations, not a condition precedent, although ultimately the Convention was
inapplicable); see also Flanagan v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 428 F. Supp. 770,
777 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (suspending the tolling of the statute of limitations based
on California law and the instruction to do so in Article 29(2) of the Warsaw
Convention, which is identical to Article 35(2) of the Montreal Convention).
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The court's two key points in concluding the statute of limita-
tions barred the plaintiffs' action were that (1) a plain reading
of the text instructs them to do so, and (2) the instructions
given to the court by Article 35(2) do not allow them to use state
law as a calculating method for alleged time-barred actions. As
to the first point, the court inappropriately ignored the second
portion of Article 35 when analyzing the plain meaning of the
text. The court merely concluded that the Montreal Convention
only allows for the three triggering events pronounced in Article
35(1), without even mentioning Article 35(2). 3 Article 35(2) is
critical when applying the Montreal Convention's statute of limi-
tations, and it was not until later in the opinion that the court
addressed, and then swiftly dismissed, the impact this section of
the Convention could have had on its decision. A plain reading
of Article 35 in its entirety would have allowed the court to apply
California law when calculating whether the plaintiffs' claim was
brought in time. Article 35(2) plainly instructs that "[t]he
method of calculating [the two-year] period shall be determined
by the law of the court seized of the case. '34 Here, the plaintiffs
brought their action in the state of California. 5 Thus, the court
should have used California law to conclude that the action had
not accrued until six months after the flight arrived at its desti-
nation. This is when the tolling should have begun for statute of
limitations purposes.
This is precisely the approach taken by the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California years earlier in Flanagan v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp.36 Flanagan held that the statute of limi-
tations of the Warsaw Convention was tolled because the Mon-
treal Convention adopted the statute of limitations of the court
to which the case was submitted .3 This reading of Article 35 is
logical and provides greater protection for families like the
Narayanans who lose loved ones at a time when their window for
bringing an action is closing.
33 Narayanan, 747 F.3d at 1128-29.
34 Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. 35(2).
35 Narayanan, 747 F.3d at 1126.
36 Note that the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California is the
same court where the plaintiffs in Narayanan brought their claim.
37 Flanagan, 428 F. Supp. at 775-76. Note that this analysis and conclusion
were based on the exact same language that still exists in the Montreal Conven-
tion. See id.
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B. PASS-THROUGH TO STATE LAW
The court could have also construed the Montreal Conven-
tion as lacking an instruction or a remedy for conditions (inju-
ries and deaths) accruing anytime after the plane has arrived at
its destination, therefore allowing a pass-through to state law.38
This would have been an appropriate response to Article 35 be-
cause it only accounts for accidents that occur on the date of
arrival, the intended arrival date, or the date on which the air-
craft stopped.39 Increasingly courts are finding that the Mon-
treal Convention and/or its statute of limitations article are
inapplicable because the Convention does not cover every cause
of action that can be brought against an airline, and conse-
quently state law must be used to fill in the gaps.4° This trend
could result in added attempts by plaintiffs to bring only state
law actions and to generally avoid the Montreal Convention. For
example, if the Narayanans had only brought a state law action,
British Airways would have had to begin its defense by success-
fully arguing that the Montreal Convention preempted the ac-
tion and then move to dismiss based on the statute of
limitations. There is a greater dispute as to whether the Mon-
treal Convention completely preempts state law actions than
there is over the interpretation of the Convention's statute of
limitations. The plaintiffs could have chosen the battle about
the Montreal Convention's preemptive effect over the battle
with the interpretation of the statute of limitations and likely
had a better chance of their claim surviving.4 ' Ultimately, future
plaintiffs with statute of limitations issues could read the court's
38 See Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 116 S. Ct. 629 (1996).
39 Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. 35(1).
40 Chubb Ins. Co. of Europe S.A. v. Menlo Worldwide Forwarding, Inc., 634
F.3d 1023, 1026 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that the Montreal Convention and its
statute of limitations do not apply to suits brought by one carrier against an-
other); Wolgel v. Mexicana Airlines, 821 F.2d 442, 443 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating
that the Convention is inapplicable to actions for "bumping"); Dejoseph v. Cont'l
Airlines, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 595, 604 (D.N.J. 2014) (stating that the Montreal
Convention does not preempt state law claims for personal injury obtained on an
airplane); Pennington v. British Airways, 275 F. Supp. 2d 601, 602 (E.D. Pa. 2003)
(stating that local procedural rule "applied in calculating the last date on which
[a] complaint could have been filed under [the] Convention"); Dasrath v. Cont'l
Airlines, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 531, 543 (D.N.J. 2002) (stating that the Convention
is inapplicable to claims seeking only injunctive relief).
41 See Akrami v. British Airways PLC, No. C 01-02882 SC, 2002 WL 31031324,
at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2002) ("The plaintiff is considered the master of her
complaint, and she is free to choose to avoid federal court by relying exclusively
on state law causes of action.").
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decision in Narayanan as a deterrent for bringing their action
under the Montreal Convention and only file state law actions to
benefit from the more advantageous limitations period. This
type of strategy to avoid the rules of the Montreal Convention
creates inconsistency and in turn affronts one of the Conven-
tion's most central goals. Eventually, all participating nations
could take notice and amend the treaty if plaintiffs increasingly
decide not to bring their claims under the Montreal
Convention.
C. DISSENT'S ARGUMENT
Based on an acknowledgement of the outdated nature of the
Montreal Convention and its failed attempt at providing equal
protection for airlines and passengers, the dissent in Narayanan
concluded that the motion to dismiss should have been denied
and the court should have heard the plaintiffs' claim. The dis-
sent argued, and this author agrees, that "[t] he Warsaw Conven-
tion was written when the'airline industry was in its vulnerable
infancy ... [and] air travel was considered risky," and thus the
Montreal Convention is unsuitable for modern times when "in-
ternational air travel [has become] a multi-billion dollar indus-
try, and the risks of flying [have] decreased exponentially. '42
While the Montreal Convention was amended just fifteen years
ago, a lot of impactful changes have taken place in that time,
especially in the area of air travel. This treaty, like any area of
the law, should be reevaluated on a more regular basis to ensure
that the rights of passengers and airlines do not become one-
sided, and that the remaining goals of the Montreal Convention
continue to be met.
V. CONCLUSION
The court in Narayanan took a strict approach to the Mon-
treal Convention's statute of limitations by interpreting it as a
condition precedent to be met by the plaintiffs as opposed to an
affirmative defense or ordinary statute of limitations. The court
reasoned that the Montreal Convention would not allow for an
additional triggering event or circumstance where tolling of the
limitations period would become necessary. Some courts could
and do read the Montreal Convention, particularly Article
35(2), as specifically allowing such a method of tolling or calcu-
42 Narayanan v. British Airways, 747 F.3d 1125, 1133 (9th Cir. 2014) (Preger-
son, J., dissenting).
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lation based on local law, but the court in Narayanan refused to
do so. Even if the court believed the Montreal Convention did
not allow for such an exception, it could have interpreted the
lack of instruction in this case as a gap in the Convention and
thus required a "pass-through" to local law. Had the court either
initially applied local law by using Article 35 (2) of the Montreal
Convention, or applied local law after recognizing the Conven-
tion inadequately directs the court on the issue of the statute of
limitations calculation, the plaintiffs claim would have survived
the motion to dismiss. The Ninth Circuit's decision will have an
impact for years to come for plaintiffs attempting to assert a
claim they believe to be timely under their local rules and will
ultimately prevent such plaintiffs from receiving justice under
the law.
I~LAS. It
